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Is It Time to Declare the ADA 
a Failed Law?
Peter Blanck





By some accounts, the track record of the Americans with Disabil-
ities Act (ADA) appears dismal for improving the employment oppor-
tunities of individuals with disabilities. Several empirical studies report
that, compared with employment of persons without disabilities, the
employment of individuals with work disabilities has declined since
the early 1990s (see Burkhauser and coauthors, Chapter 2). The
authors of some studies conclude that the ADA has failed to achieve its
goals and is, in fact, the likely cause of the employment declines (see
DeLeire, Chapter 7).
In contrast to these studies, other research finds improvements in
employment since the ADA was passed (see, e.g., Kaye 2002; Kruse
and Schur 2003). This research defines “disability” outside the context
of a self-reported work limitation, focusing as well on individuals’ self-
reported limitations in the activities of daily living. Some findings sug-
gest those most likely to be considered disabled under the ADA—indi-
viduals with severe functional limitations who were not prevented
from working—saw improvements in their relative employment
between 1991 and 1993.
One clear difference between the research streams mentioned is
how the authors define and measure disability. Of course, how
researchers identify individuals with disabilities is fundamental to
whether their findings on the ADA’s effects are informative. To be
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sure, the ADA does not guarantee employment to individuals with dis-
abilities. The law does not protect all individuals with disabilities from
discrimination, nor does it provide all individuals with disabilities a
right to reasonable workplace accommodations. Because it is possible
that the ADA has had different effects on various subgroups within the
population of individuals with disabilities, identifying and analyzing
those subgroups becomes crucial to understanding the ADA’s effects
(Zwerling et al. 2003). 
Obviously then, the answer to the question whether the ADA is
causally related to the employment rates of individuals with disabilities
requires close analysis of the legally defined group that the ADA is
meant to protect—the “ADA qualified disabled.” This analysis has not
yet been done. We conclude that because studies claiming to show sup-
port for predictions derived from economic theory both exclude in their
measure of disability individuals protected by the ADA and include
those not protected by that law, claims that the ADA is a failed law are
unfounded and premature.
In the next section, we describe two of the predominant economic
models of discrimination and how the ADA’s employment provisions
may be tied to those models’ forms of discriminatory behavior. We
follow with an overview of the predominant economic models from
which predictions are derived that the ADA will result in declines in
the employment of individuals with disabilities. We also offer a
description of studies that purport to provide support for those
predictions.
In the final section, we discuss reasons why existing research does
not allow for the conclusion that the ADA is, in effect, a well inten-
tioned, but bad law, focusing on definitions and measures of disability
used in that research. We identify questions and issues that extant
research leaves unaddressed, in part to encourage researchers to con-
tinue to develop models that will enable assessment of the ADA’s
influences, and in part to caution policymakers of the limitations of the
research and theories on which that research may be based.
We make no claim to resolving debates regarding either the ADA’s
employment effects or who should bear the costs associated with
removing barriers to employment faced by those with disabilities.
Instead, we identify questions, the answers to which will inform poli-
cymakers about whether any further or different steps in regard to the
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ADA (aside from other policy issues) should be taken to reduce unem-
ployment or labor market withdrawal of those with disabilities.
ECONOMIC MODELS OF EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION
A fundamental purpose of the ADA is to reduce discrimination
against those with disabilities and those perceived to have disabilities,
and thereby enhance their employment opportunities. Whether the
ADA has been successful, therefore, can be seen as a question of
whether discrimination has been reduced, or whether the employment
opportunities and wages of those it covers have improved over time.
To date, the focus has been on the latter question, although recent
efforts have been directed also to the former (see, e.g., DeLeire 2001).
In discussing discrimination generally, it is useful to distinguish
between discriminatory behavior that occurs prior to an individual’s
entry into the labor market and discrimination faced after entry. Indi-
viduals with disabilities (whether covered by the ADA or not) who
face premarket discrimination in education, for example, may obtain
less, or inferior, education compared with individuals without disabili-
ties (for a review, see Schwochau and Blanck 2000). Information from
the Current Population Survey (CPS) indicates that individuals with
disabilities have far lower levels of education than individuals without
disabilities.
Postmarket discrimination occurs after entry into the labor market.
This phenomenon may cause individuals with disabilities (again cov-
ered by the ADA or not) to receive lower wages and face fewer occu-
pational choices, despite having equivalent amounts of human capital
as individuals without disabilities. Postmarket discrimination also may
influence individuals’ decisions prior to entry into the labor market. If
discrimination by employers, customers, or coworkers significantly
reduces the wage received or the probability of obtaining employment,
those individuals may choose not to invest in substantial amounts of
education given that the return on this investment will be minimal.
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Becker’s Model of Postmarket Discrimination
Gary Becker has shown that one form of postmarket discrimination
originates when employers display a “taste for discrimination” (Becker
1971). If individuals in the “majority” and “minority” groups are per-
fect substitutes for one another (i.e., they are equally productive), tastes
for discrimination reflect employer perceptions that the cost of hiring
those in the minority group is greater than the cost of hiring those in the
majority group. This is “irrational discrimination”; there is no produc-
tivity-related reason for treating individuals differently. To hire an
individual from the minority group, an employer with tastes for dis-
crimination must deduct from that individual’s wages the added cost
associated with the “distaste” of including that person in the workforce.
As a result, Becker argues, wages received by those in the minority
group will be lower than the wages of the majority, despite productiv-
ity. 
One prediction derived from Becker’s model is that in perfectly
competitive markets, tastes for discrimination are minimized in the
long run if the firm’s unit cost in production does not vary with output.
So long as one firm exists with no discriminatory policy, market wages
of the minority group should be equal to those of the majority group.
This prediction relies on the profit-maximizing behavior of employers,
which leads them to capitalize on the lower market wage of the minor-
ity group and hire only (qualified) individuals in that group. Because
the nondiscriminating employer’s costs would be lower as it expands
its production, discriminatory employers would eventually be driven
out of the market and one uniform wage would result.
Statistical Discrimination
Another model of discrimination relies on notions of employer
decision-making in the context of imperfect information (see, e.g.,
Baldwin 2000). For example, when an employer seeks to hire a worker,
the employer does not have full information regarding that individual’s
future productivity. Such information, moreover, is costly to obtain.
Either the employer must spend resources on obtaining better informa-
tion regarding the candidates prior to hiring, or hire from the pool of
candidates (incurring the costs of doing so) and observe productivity
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thereafter. As a result, it is in the employer’s interest to identify rela-
tively cheap “indicators” of productivity (e.g., the number of years of
education). These indicators may be identified through perceptions of
past experiences with employees (e.g., workers with a college degree
tend to have higher productivity than those without such a degree) or
through other sources of information. The indicators used, if accurate
predictors of productivity, lead to efficient decisions, on average. 
Statistical discrimination results when employers use an indicator
such as a disability to make predictions about individuals; that is, per-
ceptions of the average employee with disabilities are used to make
predictions about one individual (i.e., a stereotype) (Aigner and Cain
1977). Even if accurate, on average, the indicator may be inaccurate
when applied to a particular individual. Thus, although an employer’s
past experiences with individuals with a particular applicant’s disabil-
ity has led the employer to equate that disability with higher costs
owing to missed days of work, the particular applicant may not have a
history of missing work any more than a nondisabled employee. The
employer’s rejection of the applicant, based on its perception of indi-
viduals with similar disabilities, would be statistical discrimination.
If the indicators used are inaccurate predictors (on average or for a
particular individual), costly mistakes can be made. Discrimination
(i.e., the differential treatment of equally productive individuals) may
persist over time under this model because employers who act consis-
tently with their perceptions may trigger responses from applicants and
employees that confirm those perceptions (Blanck 1993; Schwochau
and Blanck 2000). 
Theories of Discrimination and ADA Title I
Both of the theories of discrimination identify how employer per-
ceptions cause some individuals to be treated differently from others.
Under Becker’s theory, the crucial perceptions are wholly inaccurate;
under theories of statistical discrimination, perceptions based on a ste-
reotype are uniformly applied to all individuals within the group, again
with the result that equally productive individuals may be treated dif-
ferently.
Leaving aside for the moment the ADA’s requirement that a firm
make reasonable accommodations for its qualified disabled workers
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(42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)), the law tracks the standard definition of
discrimination: the differential treatment of those who are equally pro-
ductive. Under ADA Title I (the law’s employment provisions), quali-
fied individuals with disabilities are to be treated the same as
nondisabled individuals with respect to pay and employment decisions. 
People falling within the second and third prongs of the ADA’s
disability definition—those with a past history of disability and those
who are regarded as having a disability—may be closest to Becker’s
requirement of perfect substitutes given that they have no actual
impairment that would affect their productivity (although some of
these individuals certainly have impairments that do not rise to the
level of disability as defined under the law’s first prong). These indi-
viduals also may be the victims of wholly inaccurate stereotypes. The
ADA’s emphasis on a case-by-case analysis of whether individuals
with disabilities are qualified for the job they seek likewise is consis-
tent with an attempt to restrict the use of stereotypes (29 C.F.R. p. 1630
App.).
The addition of language requiring that employers make reason-
able accommodations for disabled workers is a departure from stan-
dard definitions of economic discrimination (Krenek 1994; Burgdorf
1997). “Economic discrimination” typically refers to individuals with
equal productivity not being rewarded with equal compensation
(Aigner and Cain 1977). The implicit assumption underlying this defi-
nition is that compensation should reflect the entire “marginal cost” of
employing the individual. The standard definition of economic dis-
crimination does not take explicit account of employer expenditures
directed at making at least some workers more productive than they
would be in the employer’s “pre-accommodation” work environment.
Indeed, the technology used to produce a product or provide a service
generally is taken as given in those models, as is the capital necessary
to operate a facility (Schartz, Schartz, and Blanck 2002). Becker’s
assumption of equal productivity implicitly holds technology constant;
an individual hired randomly from either the majority or minority
group would be equally productive within the firm. 
The ADA’s accommodation provisions (42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5))
mandate that an employer provide benefits to (or take steps in response
to the peculiar needs of) particular individuals in order that they may
perform the essential functions of the job (Jolls 2000; Kelman 2001).
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As such, the ADA imposes on employers a potential additional cost of
hiring (or retaining) an individual with disabilities. 
The ADA’s definition of discrimination, which identifies both a
failure to pay the same wage (broadly defined to include all forms of
pay) and to make reasonable accommodations, therefore departs signif-
icantly from the prior concept of economic discrimination. Not only
are individuals with disabilities entitled to be treated the same as oth-
ers, but they have, by virtue of the ADA, a claim to resources that oth-
ers are perceived not to have. The requirement that employers incur
expenses to allow individuals to be productive on the job represents a
focal point of economists’ criticisms of the ADA (see, e.g., Oi 1991),
and stands as a central element of public policy debates about the
proper confines of the ADA’s protection.
EFFECT OF ADA TITLE I
Pre-ADA Operation of Labor Markets
Because the ADA focuses on decisions made by firms, most mod-
els developed to assess its effects deal primarily with predicting the
law’s effects on labor demand (Rosen 1991). Standard economic mod-
els predict that firms combine labor and capital in ways dependent on
the relative prices of the inputs to production (i.e., the price of labor
and the price of capital), the demand for the product or service, and the
technology available (see Ehrenberg and Smith 1991 for a general
description of standard models of labor markets). In theory, a change in
any one of these factors triggers responses that move the firm toward a
new equilibrium. Thus, an increase in the price of labor may lead to a
reduction in the amount of labor demanded, and in the long run, a
change in the amount of capital used by the firm. Similarly, a change in
technology (e.g., the invention of a more efficient machine, or new use
of the Internet) may yield changes in both the amounts of labor and
capital demanded.
The simplest of economic models assumes that all labor and all
capital is identical; that is, each and every unit of labor offered is the
same, and each and every unit of available capital is the same. These
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models also assume that all parties (individuals and firms) have perfect
information and are perfectly mobile. They generally yield the expecta-
tion that a firm chooses the most profitable and efficient means of pro-
duction, given the state of technology, demand for the product, and
relative cost of capital and labor. If capital and customer buying behav-
ior is fixed, the amount of labor demanded is a function of its costs,
with the expectation that a firm will stop demanding additional labor at
the point at which the marginal revenue product of the last unit of labor
(the added revenue brought to the firm given what is produced) equals
its marginal cost (the added cost associated with that unit). The demand
for labor in a particular market is the number of workers (or units of
labor) all the firms in the market would demand at given wage rates.
Thus, under the standard model, employers will hire an individual
only if the marginal benefits of doing so at least equal the marginal
costs. This is true for individuals with and without disabilities.
Employers will incur additional employment costs (such as those asso-
ciated with medical insurance, life insurance, and pensions) only if the
benefits of doing so outweigh the costs of providing the added benefit.
If, for instance, employers find that providing fringe benefits makes
attracting and retaining employees cheaper and productivity greater,
then they will supply fringe benefits (Weaver 1991).
In general, disabilities are expected (assumed) to reduce productiv-
ity on a particular job, or to restrict the individual’s ability to be pro-
ductive in a variety of jobs (Weaver 1991). Because profits only may
be realized if pay given to employees is less than or equal to what the
sale of their output yields, the pay of disabled workers will be less than
nondisabled workers because individuals with disabilities are less pro-
ductive.
In the absence of the ADA (or any other comparable legislation),
the standard models suggest that an employer will provide a disabled
individual with tools or a particular work setting if doing so is profit-
able (Rosen 1991; Weaver 1991). As in the case of fringe benefits,
however, disabled individuals provided with such accommodations
should expect their wages to be reduced accordingly. If no such reduc-
tion occurs, the net gain to the employer of hiring the disabled individ-
ual who needs accommodation will be less than the net gain of hiring
an individual needing no such accommodation, and the employer will
maximize profits by hiring the nondisabled individual (Donohue
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1994). Under such a model of the employer’s decision-making, the
chronic unemployment of the disabled is owing, in part, to the fact that
they cost more, causing employers to prefer nondisabled individuals
(Weaver 1991).
Thus, disabled persons’ wages are predicted to be less than the
wages of nondisabled individuals for two primary reasons: lower pro-
ductivity, and/or increased marginal costs owing to accommodation.
Individuals with disabilities for whom the lower pay does not justify
participation in the labor market (for instance, those for whom the
expected wage is sufficiently low that the costs of labor market partici-
pation exceed its benefits) will drop out of that market or will never
enter it.
Note that these principles yield the conclusion that the ADA is not
necessary. Employers do, without the ADA, what is economically
rational and efficient. Disabled individuals are hired, with or without
accommodations, to the extent that doing so is profitable (Barnard
1992). They are matched to jobs throughout the economy in ways that
maximize firm profits and individual utility. 
Introduction of ADA Title I
With this picture of employer behavior as a starting point, predic-
tions of the effects of the ADA focus on what the law forces employers
to do differently (Barnard 1992). Viewing the pre-ADA environment
as efficient overall, it should be no surprise that the ADA is predicted
to lead to inefficiencies and to the imposition of costs on all, or virtu-
ally all, affected. Economists have tended to focus on the effects of two
of the ADA’s provisions: the “equal pay” requirement, and the reason-
able accommodation requirement. Each is often predicted to have dele-
terious effects on individuals with and without disabilities, on firms,
and on the economy (Weaver 1991).
The provision of the ADA that prohibits employers from discrimi-
nating against qualified individuals with disabilities with regard to
compensation and other benefits of employment (42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)
(1994)) is viewed as forcing employers to pay more for the labor of
such individuals than they otherwise would. There are two components
to the “otherwise would” aspect of this prediction. First, to the extent
that two individuals, one disabled who needs no accommodation and
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one not disabled, are in fact equally productive, requiring that the
employer pay each the same wage for the same work when it would not
otherwise do so is an attempt to reduce discrimination of the type
described by Becker (1971). 
Second, although such a requirement may hasten the exit of dis-
criminating employers from the market,1 one may predict that forcing
an employer to pay more than it otherwise would for labor perceived to
be less beneficial will lead to a reduction in the employment of those
individuals in the short run, as fewer persons are demanded in the face
of increasing wages (Donohue 1986). This effect of the “equal pay”
provision is not, however, the focal point of most discussions.
Instead, modelers tend to assume that the ADA-qualified individ-
ual with a disability is less productive than a nondisabled person with-
out accommodation.2 Given the assumed difference in productivity, the
equal pay provision is seen as forcing employers to pay individuals
with disabilities more than they are “worth” to the firm. The increase in
pay is predicted to cost the employment of at least some individuals
with disabilities, as fewer such persons are demanded at the higher
wage (Acemoglu and Angrist 2001). Higher wages also would attract
more individuals with disabilities to the labor market (Jolls 2000).
However, because fewer persons are demanded, these new entrants
will be unemployed. 
The ADA’s requirement that employers pay qualified disabled and
nondisabled individuals the same compensation for the same work also
has been said to harm all persons with disabilities in their attempts to
compete in the labor market (see, e.g., Olson 1997). Epstein (1992),
who advocates allowing labor markets to operate entirely free of gov-
ernmental restraint, notes that laws such as the ADA, the Fair Labor
Standards Act, and the Occupational Safety and Health Act, restrict a
disabled person’s ability to underbid their nondisabled competition by
forbidding negotiation between the individual and the firm as to the
conditions of employment. 
Instead, so the argument goes, individuals with disabilities should
be free to, for example, “waiv[e] their right to health and life insur-
ance” and thereby “improve their prospects of getting a job without
having to call into play the coercive power of the state” (Epstein 1992,
p. 493; see also Friedland and Evans 1996). A variant of this argument
focuses on the inability of individuals with disabilities to negotiate a
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reduction in their wage to compensate for the increase in the so-called
“firing costs” realized by the employer when an individual with dis-
abilities sues to challenge the employer’s decision to fire the worker
(Acemoglu and Angrist 2001). 
The ADA’s requirement that firms make “reasonable accommoda-
tions” for their employees and applicants with disabilities also is pre-
dicted to have negative effects on disabled individuals. By increasing
productivity and removing the obligation to personally pay for accom-
modations, the ADA’s accommodation requirement, Rosen (1991)
argues, should increase the number of individuals with disabilities who
seek employment at any wage. However, the increase in the supply of
labor could well reduce the wages of nondisabled individuals, who will
drop out of the labor market as a result (Rosen 1991).
On the demand side, as noted, the ADA is predicted to force firms
to pay more than an individual is “worth” to the firm, and to do so at
every wage. In short, the ADA’s accommodation mandate is expected
to force employers to provide accommodations they otherwise would
not provide (i.e., those that are not profitable) and the ADA’s equal pay
requirement prevents the added expense to be transferred to the
employee through a lower wage (Rosen 1991). 
Thus, if employers comply with the ADA, the added labor costs
associated with accommodating qualified employees with disabilities
will result in lower demand for workers with disabilities (Weaver
1991; DeLeire 1997). Overall, negative effects on the employment of
individuals with disabilities are predicted to be greater as the costs of
accommodation increase. To the extent that firms make accommoda-
tions that do not yield net gains in profitability, the dollars spent in
accommodations could be spent in areas having greater returns. There-
fore, the expenditures represent a cost to society in the form of mis-
spent resources. If employers compensate for the increase in labor
costs by raising product prices, customers bear the ultimate burden
(Weaver 1991). 
In summary, the dominant economic models predict that, all else
equal, employment of otherwise qualified individuals with disabilities
will decline as a result of the ADA’s implementation. This effect stems
from the increased wages that must be paid to covered workers, and to
the increased costs associated with mandated accommodations. This is
not to suggest that employment of some subgroups within the disabled
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population will not increase, only that the number of people without
jobs will be greater than the number gaining (or retaining) them
(Weaver 1991).
Enforcement and Accommodation Mandates
Jolls (2000) departs from the standard models above in examining
the effects of accommodation mandates on individuals with and with-
out disabilities under different enforcement scenarios. Using a model
that builds on the work of Summers (1989), Jolls demonstrates that
whether qualified disabled or nondisabled individuals realize employ-
ment losses as a result of the ADA’s accommodation requirement
depends on the degree to which binding legal restrictions exist on
employers’ ability to pay different wages to individuals with and with-
out disabilities (to have “wage differentials”), and to provide different
employment opportunities to individuals with and without disabilities
(“employment differentials”). 
 In Jolls’s model, the supply of labor of individuals with disabili-
ties will increase at every wage by the value of the accommodations,
on average, to disabled individuals. Employers’ demand will fall at
every wage by the cost of the accommodations to employers. The
effect of these changes depends on whether the value of accommoda-
tions to individuals with disabilities exceeds the cost to employers, and
on the degree to which legal restrictions are binding. Thus, where nei-
ther the pay nor the employment restriction is binding, relative wages
are predicted to fall as a result of the costs of accommodating individu-
als with disabilities, and relative employment will rise, fall, or remain
unchanged if the value of the accommodations to individuals with dis-
abilities exceeds, is less than, or is equal to their cost to employers,
respectively. 
Jolls concludes that where only the ADA’s equal pay requirement
is binding on employers, individuals with disabilities can be expected
to suffer relative employment losses and either flat or increased rela-
tive wages, and those workers will shoulder most of the costs of the
accommodations. Where both restrictions are binding, she predicts that
the relative wage of qualified individuals with disabilities is likely to
rise or stay the same and the relative employment of those individuals
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will rise, in part because nondisabled individuals will shoulder some of
the costs of the accommodation mandate.
Empirical Tests of the Predicted Effects of ADA Title I
Given the relative newness of the law, rigorous empirical tests of
the ADA’s effects on relative employment and wages are understand-
ably few in number. The research streams of Acemoglu and Angrist
(2001), and of DeLeire (1997, 2000, 2001) have received particular
attention. Both streams are based on economic theory and attempt to
assess the ADA’s effects on the employment and wages of individuals
with disabilities.
DeLeire (1997, 2000) employs seven panels of the Survey of
Income and Program Participation (SIPP) data for men aged 18–64 to
examine whether the ADA has affected the likelihood of employment
and wages of individuals with disabilities. Acemoglu and Angrist
(2001) use CPS data for men and women aged 21–58 for the 1988–
1997 period to extend the standard economic model by incorporating
concepts of hiring and firing costs. Within that model, hiring costs
arise as firms reject applicants with disabilities, who with some proba-
bility challenge those decisions in court. Firing costs are incurred when
employers terminate or lay off employees with disabilities, who with
some probability challenge those decisions.
Because firms can avoid hiring costs by employing individuals
with disabilities, Acemoglu and Angrist’s model allows the prediction
that the ADA may lead to increases in employment levels. The proba-
bility of detecting discrimination on the basis of disability, however, is
much smaller for applicants than for current employees, and thus firing
costs and the costs of accommodation together are likely to exceed hir-
ing costs avoided. As a result, the law is predicted to reduce employ-
ment (hiring). The “equal pay” provision is expected to increase wages
for disabled employees, creating involuntary unemployment.
Both sets of studies report findings that the authors contend sup-
port their models’ general predictions (Acemoglu and Angrist 2001;
DeLeire 1997). DeLeire (2000) summarizes his findings as indicating
that the ADA has led to a 7.2 percent decrease in the probability of
employment of individuals with disabilities, but to no change in rela-
tive wages. He attributes these findings to the costs to employers of
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complying with the ADA’s accommodation requirement. Acemoglu
and Angrist conclude that the ADA has had substantial disemployment
effects on men with disabilities aged 21–58, and on women with dis-
abilities under age 40. They find no clear evidence of a post–ADA
change in relative wages of individuals with disabilities. Acemoglu and
Angrist attribute their employment findings, in part, to the accommo-
dation costs of the ADA and, in part, to the firing costs the law
imposes.
Both sets of studies include a consideration of the effects of federal
disability receipts. DeLeire does so by assessing possible changes in
the level of benefits available, in eligibility, and in denial rates
(DeLeire 1997, 2000). Reviewing data on these variables, he concludes
that federal benefits are not likely to explain his results. DeLeire (1997)
also considers the possible effects of the 1990–1991 recession. Using
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data, he investigates whether
pre–1990 recessions led to widening gaps between employment rates
of individuals with and without disabilities. Because those rates did not
significantly widen in prior recessions, DeLeire concludes that the wid-
ening rates he finds after January 1991 are not from the downturn in
late 1990 and early 1991. 
Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) test whether receipt of federal dis-
ability benefits explain their findings. Because overall results allow for
the same conclusions regarding fewer weeks worked by individuals
with disabilities, the authors conclude that receipt of federal benefits
does not account for most of the decline in employment found (Bound
and Waidmann 2000). Having eliminated this alternative explanation,
Acemoglu and Angrist, like DeLeire, conclude that the ADA has nega-
tively affected individuals’ with disabilities relative employment.
DOES THE ADA EXACERBATE THE EMPLOYMENT 
PROBLEM?
With authors using large national samples attributing to the ADA
their findings of lower employment among disabled individuals, are we
to conclude that the law has failed in achieving its goals? We believe
the answer to this question is no for a number of reasons, the primary
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one of which is related to the definition and measure of disability
employed in these studies.
Definition and Measurement of Disability
The definition of disability and the identification of those in that
protected category obviously are critical to research addressing the
labor market behavior of individuals with disabilities. If the purpose of
the research is to examine labor demand and supply of those with dis-
abilities relative to those without disabilities, using a measure that asks
individuals whether they are “disabled,” whether they have an impair-
ment, or whether they have a disability that prevents or limits the work
they can perform may be sufficient (but see Hale 2001; Kaye 2002).3
The emphasis of this line of research could be on the general labor
market experiences of individuals with disabilities, with an eye toward
providing policymakers with an assessment of labor market barriers
faced by those individuals. 
However, such an approach, taken without regard to the ADA’s
language, is unlikely to yield valid conclusions if the goal is to assess
the effects of that law (Hale 2001; Schwochau and Blanck 2000, 2003).
Even if the relative employment of people with work disabilities fell
during the 1990s (Burkhauser and coauthors, Chapter 2), the findings
of DeLeire and Acemoglu and Angrist do not answer the question of
whether the ADA has been effective since it was enacted because little
to no consideration is given to whether the individuals captured by the
selected measure of disability are, in fact, those covered by the ADA’s
provisions.
Those covered by the ADA’s protections are people who have a
substantial limitation on a major daily life activity who are “quali-
fied”—that is, those who with or without reasonable accommodation
can perform essential job functions (Blanck 1998). Thus, the ADA
does not provide coverage to all persons with physical or mental limi-
tations, or even to all persons with “disabilities” as the ADA defines
that term. The law divides individuals with impairments into three
groups: individuals with impairments that do not substantially limit a
major life activity; individuals with substantial limitations who are
qualified; and individuals with substantial limitations who are not qual-
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ified. The law provides protection to those in the second group, but not
to those in the first or third group (Lee 1997). 
Neither DeLeire nor Acemoglu and Angrist distinguish between
these three groups. Instead, DeLeire divides his sample into disabled
and nondisabled categories based on a question that asks respondents
whether they have a physical, mental, or other health condition that
limits the kind or amount of work that they can do (DeLeire 1997,
2000). This is the standard SIPP-based item used in tabulating broad
indicators of labor force participation of individuals with self-reported,
work-limiting impairments (McNeil 1993). 
The item Acemoglu and Angrist use to categorize the disabled
comes from the CPS March Income Supplement and asks whether
individuals “have a health problem or disability which prevents [them]
from working or which limits the kind and the amount of work [they]
can do.” Both definitions are narrower than the ADA’s definition of
disability in that they focus on impairments that limit working activity
(rather than any major life activity). Interestingly, the U.S. Supreme
Court has raised questions whether working is even a major life activ-
ity for purposes of the law (see Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Inc. v.
Williams 2002).
The potential difference between the ADA’s “major life activity”
definition and the SIPP’s work-disability definition is reflected in
items in the SIPP survey that focus on functional and other limitations.
From 1991 to 1992, 52.0 percent of individuals aged 21–64 with a dis-
ability were reported as employed, whereas only 42.5 percent of those
with a work disability were employed (McNeil 1993). Although indi-
viduals with work disabilities were included in the overall disability
category, the difference in figures suggests that at least some of those
answering that they did not have a work activity limitation also indi-
cated that they were limited in other areas (see also Kruse and Schur
2003).
Comparable figures for 1994–1995 were 52.4 percent (disabled)
and 43.3 percent (work disability) (U.S. Census Bureau 2000) (see
Burkhauser and coauthors, Chapter 2, for additional information
regarding the employment rates of individuals with disabilities using
alternative definitions of disability and alternative data sets). Unless
individuals reporting themselves as disabled, but not as having a work
disability, are those who would be considered without a substantial
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limitation under the ADA, the difference in the figures raises the possi-
bility that some individuals who have substantial limitations on major
life activities other than working were miscategorized as not disabled
(Baldwin, Zeager, and Flacco 1994).
Within the category of individuals with disabilities, a problem
arises when individuals who clearly are not qualified under the ADA
are included (42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994)). For example, DeLeire and
Acemoglu and Angrist’s disabled category includes those persons
whose impairments prevent them from working at all (presumably,
even with attempted accommodation). Individuals whose disabilities
prevent them from working are considered not qualified, and therefore
do not receive the protection of the ADA (see Duckett v. Dunlop Tire
Corp. 1997). Information from the SIPP data for 1991–1992 suggests
that 42.1 percent of individuals aged 16–64 with work disabilities were
prevented from working (McNeil 1993). Because the studies rely on
comparisons of the disabled and the nondisabled, including in the “dis-
abled” category individuals who cannot work at all would depress
coefficients associated with disability and make differences more
likely to be found (Mashaw and Reno 1996).
Further, changes over time in the proportion of individuals within
the disabled category who were unable to work would have implica-
tions for empirical results. For instance, increases in relative size over
the period of interest of the “prevented from working” subgroup would
over time increase the likelihood of finding significant differences
between the disabled and those not disabled. Acemoglu and Angrist
(2001) and DeLeire (1997) recognize that, as a percentage of the popu-
lation, the number of disabled individuals increased during the time
periods under investigation.
What those researchers do not consider, however, is evidence sug-
gesting that the percentage of those with work disabilities who are
unable to work also increased during the period of interest (Kaye 1998,
2002; Kaye et al. 1996; McNeil 1997; Burkhauser and coauthors,
Chapter 2). The increase in the percentage of those unable to work has
been greatest for individuals between the ages of 18 and 44, although a
general trend upward is discernible for older workers (Kaye 1998,
2002).4
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What a Difference a Definition Makes
Research conducted by Kruse and Schur (2003) demonstrates the
potential usefulness of not only focusing on individuals with work dis-
abilities, but also examining indicators of functional limitations on
other life activities. Using SIPP data, Kruse and Schur tested variables
measuring work disability (the same measure used by DeLeire), func-
tional limitations or limitations on activities of daily living, and severe
functional limitations or severe limitations on activities of daily living.
In combination with other information, Kruse and Schur examined rel-
ative employment of individuals in those categories, and assessed rela-
tive employment of individuals who did not receive Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) or Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI)
payments; indicated that their health condition did not prevent them
from working; and indicated that they had functional limitations but
did not have a work disability.
Kruse and Schur’s findings with respect to those reporting a work
disability were in line with DeLeire and Acemoglu and Angrist—the
employment prospects of those individuals worsened after the ADA
was passed. However, other results suggested that, by 1993 and 1994,
the relative employment of individuals who had functional limitations
or limitations on activities of daily living, but no work disability,
improved. Some findings suggested that those most likely to be consid-
ered disabled under the ADA—individuals with severe functional limi-
tations who were not prevented from working—saw improvements in
their relative employment between 1991 and 1993. The findings
reported by Kruse and Schur demonstrate, generally, that conclusions
about the relative employment of individuals with disabilities depend
very much on the how the disabled are identified (Kaye 2002; Stern
1989; Stoddard et al. 1998).
Policy Implications and Suggestions for Future Research
If unacceptably large numbers of individuals with disabilities are
without jobs, will a law such as the ADA (or even an amended ADA)
bring about enhanced employment? Or, will such a law only make
employment more difficult for all individuals with disabilities to find
and to keep? Do we need a law like the ADA, or should we, as some
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have urged (e.g., Epstein 1992), rely on market forces to sort those
with disabilities into jobs?
Criticism of the ADA, at least as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme
Court, is not restricted to those who see the law as unnecessary. Some
fault the ADA’s definition of disability as unduly restrictive and advo-
cate that those with any limitation on a major life activity should be
covered rather than merely those with a substantial limitation (see, e.g.,
Lee 2003). Amendment of the ADA is possible (but perhaps not politi-
cally feasible) to bring into the scope of the ADA a larger (but
unknown) percentage of individuals with disabilities. Will such
amendment worsen the existing employment problem? 
The standard economic model would suggest “yes,” and thus
amendment or case law interpretation to broaden the ADA’s coverage
will only add to the problem. Broadening the coverage of the ADA will
increase the number of possible legal challenges and may increase the
success rate of ADA litigants (particularly those who will be able to
pass the “disabled” threshold hurdle). This would be predicted to
increase the employer’s hiring costs and firing costs associated with
ADA litigation (Acemoglu and Angrist 2001). 
Expanding the scope of the definition of disability also will
increase the number of individuals to whom employers will have
accommodation obligations. To the extent that firing costs and the
costs of accommodation are greater than the hiring subsidies, economic
theory would predict that the net effect will be to increase the costs of
employing workers with disabilities, and to reduce the wages and
employment of individuals with disabilities (Acemoglu and Angrist
2001). Thus, applying the standard competitive model would predict
that the employment of individuals with disabilities will decline further
if the ADA’s definition of disability is broadened.
Yet, determining whether a broader definition of disability will, in
fact, have the deleterious effects predicted by economic theory will
require that we learn more than we currently know about who reports
they have a disability and why those individuals are, or are not,
employed. We are far from knowing enough about the labor market
experiences of individuals with disabilities to determine that the ADA
should be amended, repealed, or more strictly enforced. 
We simply cannot say why it is that individuals with work disabili-
ties continue to face barriers to employment. Is it because of the
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ADA’s accommodation mandate, as DeLeire and Acemoglu and
Angrist suggest? Is it because of premarket decisions of individuals?
Or, is it because of other forces operating separately from the ADA,
such as barriers to adequate and affordable health insurance or to eco-
nomic disincentives in federal benefit programs (Blanck and Schartz
2001). Without the why, informed decisions regarding appropriate pol-
icy cannot be made.
Measurement issues
Getting to the why requires that researchers grapple with myriad
issues surrounding the who—that is, how is “disability” to be measured
and what are the characteristics of individuals captured by the measure
selected. The study of individuals with disabilities brings numerous
complications that do not exist in a study of individuals of different
gender or races. Individuals’ limitations differ in nature, severity, and
age at onset. An individual’s ability to work may vary over time
because of the episodic nature of particular impairments (Silverstein
2002). Certain conditions may worsen with time, or fluctuate between
severe and manageable (see generally Brief for Petitioner, US Airways
v. Barnett 2001; Blanck et al. 2002).5
In addition, many work-related impairments, for example, carpel
tunnel or back injury, require an individualized assessment. Because
symptoms vary widely from person to person (Toyota Motor Manufac-
turing, Inc. v. Williams 2002), assumptions regarding disability status
cannot be made from impairments individuals may state they have.
Even creating a measure that is based on what may be called “objec-
tive” accommodation criteria—for example, the need for particular
devices or products (a TTY telecomm device; voice-recognition soft-
ware) or the need for assistance of another person to accomplish a par-
ticular task—may not yield what appear to be consistent answers over
time (Berven and Blanck 1998).
Further complicating matters is that the ADA’s definition of dis-
ability—“a physical or mental condition that substantially limits a
major life activity”—is subject to varied interpretations by courts, poli-
cymakers, employers, and persons with disabilities. Critics of the ADA
have noted the ambiguities within the law’s provisions, identifying
myriad difficulties associated with determining who falls into the
ADA’s definition of disabled (Weaver 1991; Barnard 1992). What is
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“a major life activity” under the ADA? What constitutes a “substantial
limitation” on a major life activity?
The answer to these questions is not obvious, and an answer today
may be in need of revision tomorrow. In 1999, contrary to prior inter-
pretations of the ADA, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that factors
that mitigate an individual’s impairment—such as prosthetic devices or
blood pressure medication—are to be considered in defining whether
that person’s impairment is substantially limiting for purposes of the
ADA (Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc. 1999). In 2002, the Supreme
Court concluded further that an individual is substantially limited in
performing manual tasks for purposes of the ADA only if the impair-
ment prevents or severely limits that individual from activities that are
central to daily life (Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Inc. v. Williams
2002).
From Kruse and Hale’s (2002) description of the efforts to find a
reliable and accurate measure of disability, it may be concluded that
merely asking individuals whether they have a physical or mental con-
dition that substantially limits a major life activity likely will not reli-
ably identify those covered by the ADA. Difficult measurement issues
stem also from the ADA’s basic focus on a physical or mental condi-
tion that limits one’s activities; if an individual perceives him- or her-
self not to be limited, he or she will not respond affirmatively to
questions focusing on “limitations” or “difficulties.” This is undoubt-
edly a good thing from a policy and social perspective; it is not such a
good thing if one is interested in measuring the effects of the ADA. 
As Kruse and Schur (2003) point out, if the ADA is effective in
eliminating barriers that historically have thwarted attempts of individ-
uals with disabilities to work, over time fewer and fewer individuals
will identify themselves as being limited in their ability to work. Tech-
nological innovations and the movement to achieve independence also
will decrease the number of individuals identifying limitations in major
life activities (Blanck and Sandler 2000). 
In short, even if the law were responsible for changes in individu-
als’ views regarding whether they are limited in the activities of daily
life, and for the increased employment rates of those individuals, they
would be treated as not disabled under our current measurement
approaches using cross-sectional or longitudinal data. This would tend
to increase the likelihood of obtaining empirical results that suggest the
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ADA has had a negative, or no, effect on the employment of individu-
als with disabilities (Blanck 1997).
The task facing those attempting to identify an accurate and reli-
able measure of disability is, for these and other reasons, extremely dif-
ficult (Burkhauser and coauthors, Chapter 2). Kruse and Schur’s
(2003) work testing a functional limitation definition of disability
should be viewed as encouragement to those faced with that task, as
well as others who seek to devise or choose a disability measure to
examine the effects of the ADA, because it demonstrates the potential
benefits from using multiple measures of disability.
The use of measures of functional limitations in addition to mea-
sures that capture limitations on an individual’s ability to work will
enable further investigation into the reasons why results appear to dif-
fer depending on which measure is employed. Incorporating both
would allow analysis of the large numbers of individuals reporting
work disabilities but no other functional limitations. These individuals
have had, arguably, the worst success rate in ADA litigation, as they
are most likely to be forced to simultaneously argue that they are sub-
stantially limited in their ability to work in a range of jobs (or in daily
life tasks), but are nonetheless qualified to do the job in question.
Indeed, this issue was at the crux of the Court’s Toyota decision.
In future analyses of either the labor force participation or employ-
ment status of individuals with disabilities, it is also crucial to examine
measures of disability that go beyond the use of “yes/no” indicators of
group membership (Collignon 1997). Such indicator variables treat
those with disabilities as a relatively homogenous group, particularly
given that a number of other individual characteristics often are left
unmeasured. Research examining measures of severity and employ-
ment suggests that severity is, as may be expected, inversely related to
the probability of working (Loprest, Rupp, and Sandell 1995). We have
seen in prior research that measures of disability, limitations, and
health each appear to explain variation in the phenomena being
addressed (Blanck 2001; Stein 2000a).
Although all of the information desired is not likely to be contained
in existing data sets, researchers must acknowledge the unique chal-
lenges that accompany the study of individuals with disabilities, and,
until new measures are devised and expanded data sets are assembled,
marshal the information that is available. The SIPP and CPS contain
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information that may allow those prevented from working to be identi-
fied (Schwochau and Blanck 2000, 2003; Kruse and Schur 2003). Sur-
veys have asked individuals questions that provide the basis for a
measure of severity (McNeil 1993). Only by examining many aspects
of individuals’ disabilities can we assess the extent to which the ADA
has helped or hindered the efforts of those with disabilities to move
into, and to stay in, the workplace, and ultimately understand the why
underlying the results we obtain.
Effects of other individual and job characteristics
In addition to examining other measures of disability, it is impor-
tant to incorporate into models of labor market behavior measures of
individuals’ productivity, such as education, job training, and work
experience (Blanck and Schartz 2001). The lack of work experience
has been described as among the principal reasons individuals with dis-
abilities have difficulty finding employment (Collignon 1986). Some
research reports that individuals with disabilities in the samples
employed had more working experience, on average, but also more
years of missed experience (Baldwin and Johnson 1995).
Results reported by DeLeire (2000) suggest that the probability of
employment in some sectors and types of jobs declined by a greater
degree than others. The effects of changes in the nature of jobs avail-
able in the economy may, in part, explain declining employment of
individuals with disabilities (Yelin and Cisternas 1996). Stapleton,
Goodman, and Houtenville (Chapter 4) have empirically assessed the
possibility that jobs’ requirements have changed over time in ways that
make it less likely that those with disabilities will be able to compete
for positions. Investigation into these sorts of questions will assist in
identifying why individuals with disabilities face barriers to employ-
ment despite the ADA (Blanck and Sandler 2000).
Labor supply and productivity issues
Models of discrimination build on models of the functioning of
labor markets. Within those models, individuals are matched with jobs
as a result of their decisions and those of employers. Although
researchers have theorized that the ADA will have the effect of
increasing labor supply (see, e.g., Jolls 2000), empirical work to date
has focused on the demand side of the market. To understand why indi-
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viduals with disabilities still appear to face significant employment
hurdles, we need to learn more about the labor force participation deci-
sions of those with ADA covered disabilities6 (Blanck 2000, 2001;
O’Day, Schartz, and Blanck 2002; Zwerling et al. 2002), and human
capital decisions of those individuals.
Under standard economic models, an individual’s decision to look
for employment reflects consideration of the value of time spent in
work and in nonwork activities. How much available time the individ-
ual devotes to either activity depends on factors such as the value of an
hour spent at work (usually taken as the wage rate), the value to the
individual of that same hour in nonwork activities (e.g., household
maintenance, child care, personal care, leisure, and so on), and sources
of wealth that are not dependent on working for pay (Ehrenberg and
Smith 1991). An individual will devote a positive number of hours to
working for pay when the benefits of doing so (in terms of the wage
rate, and the value of work as an activity) outweigh the costs (e.g.,
what is given up by spending time at work rather than in other activi-
ties, and the direct costs associated with going to work, such as trans-
portation costs, clothing, and child care). 
Kaye (1998) estimates that between 1990 and 1994, only 52 per-
cent of 18–64-year-olds with “chronic health conditions or impair-
ments” were working or seeking work. The factors noted above
highlight some of the reasons why disabled individuals (covered by the
ADA and not) may decide not to participate in the labor force. First,
low wages may cause an individual to determine that the costs of work-
ing outweigh the benefits of doing so (Burke 1997). Second, with a
fixed number of hours in a day, a disabled individual may find that
there are fewer hours than can be dedicated to work, given the number
of hours that must be devoted to personal care and other basic tasks (Oi
1991).
Oi (1991) describes how four aspects of disability are important in
individuals’ labor supply decisions: severity, age at onset of disability,
anticipated duration of disability, and the disability’s effect on
expected length of life (see also Burkhauser and Daly 1996).7 The
ADA’s equal pay and accommodation provisions have been predicted
to affect the perceived benefits of working. Empirical examination of
the probability that an individual was in the labor market (employed or
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actively seeking work for pay) would assist in isolating reasons why
only some individuals with disabilities may be benefited by the ADA.
Research also has not yet examined empirically the effects of the
ADA on decisions of individuals with disabilities to invest in human
capital. Differences between persons with and without disabilities in
areas such as life expectancies (length of one’s working life), expected
market wage, length of time needed to complete an educational or
training program, and difficulties associated with acquiring skills and
abilities lead to different decisions regarding the degree to which each
group will invest in its own human capital. When an individual
becomes disabled also will influence his or her decisions regarding
human capital investment (Baldwin and Johnson 1995; Oi 1991). Less
investment in human capital also may be the result of negative stigma
toward individuals with disability. As Becker (1996, p. 147) states:
A novel theoretical development in recent years is the analysis of
the consequences of stereotyped reasoning or statistical discrimi-
nation. This analysis suggests that the beliefs of employers, teach-
ers, and other influential groups that minority members are less
productive can be self-fulfilling, for these beliefs may cause
minorities to underinvest in education, training, and work skills,
such as punctuality. The underinvestment does make them less
productive.
The ADA, through its accommodation and equal pay requirement,
has the potential to break this vicious cycle, thus narrowing the produc-
tivity gap between the disabled and the nondisabled. Younger individu-
als with disabilities may be less likely stay out of the labor force
because of investments in education, if those investments are perceived
to be associated with greater future benefits and have been made less
difficult because of the ADA’s provisions (Jolls 2000, 2001). Whether
the ADA has triggered greater investment in education could be
assessed by comparing years of schooling or training before and after
the law’s enactment. It may take a longer horizon than a decade, how-
ever, to capture the effects of changes in human capital decisions on
employment.
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Truly Difficult Policy Issues
The only way to assess whether the ADA is, overall, a beneficial or
harmful piece of legislation is by assessing information regarding its
influences (Blanck and Millender 2000; Blanck and Song 2001;
National Council on Disability 1996). To be useful to policymakers,
that information must be derived from rigorous study of the behaviors
of primary actors affected by the legislation (Blanck et al. 2003). In the
case of ADA Title I, these actors are qualified employees with and
without disabilities and the firms that employ them. Researchers in dif-
ferent fields of study will approach questions regarding the ADA from
distinct perspectives, and policymakers will gain a more complete pic-
ture of the ADA’s influences if contributions to the pool of information
represent a variety of approaches.
Undoubtedly, within that pool, some studies will conclude that the
ADA has had harmful effects; others will conclude that the law has had
beneficial influences; and still others will present a mix. Our concern
here has been with studies based on economic theories of labor market
behavior. It is crucial for policymakers and researchers to understand
the limitations of these empirical studies (O’Day, Schartz, and Blanck
2002). In light of the flaws identified, we submit that existing empirical
research provides little basis on which policymakers can make
informed decisions regarding whether the ADA is the cause of employ-
ment declines and should be thus be amended, repealed, or left
untouched.
Policymakers must concern themselves, however, not only with
the validity of existing and future studies, but also with the limitations
of the theoretical models on which those studies are based. Economic
theory, because it allows us to focus on incentives and disincentives in
the labor market, will undoubtedly assist in assessing what policy, if
any, should replace the ADA. The assumptions and viewpoints embed-
ded in that theory, however, may be argued to go beyond an emphasis
on efficiency to perceptions of what efficiency means (Schwochau and
Blanck 2000; Stein 2000a).
Under simple economic models, all nondisabled labor is identical,
all disabled labor is identical, markets are perfectly competitive, and
actors in those markets have perfect information.8 Of course, in the real
world, all labor and all capital is not identical, people do not have per-
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fect information, and all markets do not operate efficiently in the
absence of a law such as the ADA (Collignon 1986). However, even if
variation and imperfect information are allowed within the labor and
capital markets, it still may be argued that firms will do what is most
efficient and most profitable, on average. Decisions will be based on
information regarding the qualities of the average unit of labor or capi-
tal, the degree of variability in each respective market, and the
expected costs and benefits of acquiring more information (Stein
2000b, 2000c). 
For example, firms spend hundreds of thousands of dollars select-
ing a CEO, and this expenditure far exceeds the costs associated with
selecting clerical workers. This difference, in part, reflects variation in
the respective labor markets and the costs and benefits associated with
gaining additional information about candidates for each type of posi-
tion. The goal in each case, however, is to select the most productive
individual, given the costs. Whether this goal is met is, of course, a
matter of speculation at the time of hire. Over time, however, employ-
ers will make changes in their hiring practices (if the benefit of the
change exceeds its costs) so that, on average, incorrect decisions will
be reduced to tolerable levels.
Economic theory also generally would predict that an employer
structures the firm’s work environment to enable workers, on average,
to attain the desired level of productivity (again given the costs and
benefits associated with alternative orderings and available technolo-
gies). If the majority of workers are viewed as unimpaired, the work
environment can be expected to build on assumptions that workers
have no limitations on their abilities to see, hear, walk, climb stairs, lift,
carry, grasp door knobs, write, speak, and so on (Burgdorf 1997).
Because of employers’ incentives to maximize profits, this environ-
ment becomes the baseline—the appropriate, efficient manner in which
to order work and the work environment given the perceived character-
istics of the average individual in the relevant labor markets (Rosen
1991). Accommodations, therefore, represent deviations from pre-
sumptively efficient status quo necessitated by the appearance in the
candidate pool, or in the current workforce, of individuals with disabil-
ities—individuals whose characteristics differ from those of the
“model (able-bodied) worker” around whom the work environment
was built (Krenek 1994).
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The questions that the ADA’s reasonable accommodation require-
ment poses are to which accommodations should individuals with dis-
abilities be entitled, and who should bear the costs of those
accommodations (Kelman 2001; US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett 2002). On
its face, the ADA imposes on the employer the burden of paying for
accommodations, a result that some have noted is justified on the basis
of past decisions to structure working environments as they are
(Kelman 2001). 
Economic theory’s predictions regarding the effects of the ADA on
employment and wage of qualified individuals with disabilities can be
seen as the market operating to transfer at least some of the employer’s
costs to individuals with disabilities (either through lower employment
or lower wages). However, the labor supply and demand models
deliver only a local equilibrium, not a global equilibrium from the
social planner’s point of view. Those models fail to realize that a per-
son with a disability who chooses not to enter the labor market receives
some form of transfer payment and the transfer payment comes from
the taxpayers’ pockets.
The question, therefore, is whether from a social perspective, it is
more efficient for employers to incur the accommodation cost so that
the individual with a disability works for pay instead of drawing on the
transfer payment, or for taxpayers to support this individual. The
answer depends on the wage rate, accommodation cost, the size of
transfer payment, and value of output produced by the individual. A
social planner will see to the enforcement of employer accommodation
if the total social benefit (reduction in transfer payment plus increase in
output) exceeds the total social cost (wage rate plus accommodation
cost) (Wax 2003).
CONCLUSION
A benefit to assembling research from a number of fields is that
differing perspectives, assumptions, priorities, and viewpoints are
brought to the fore as results are compared and attempts are made to
reconcile apparently conflicting conclusions. It is unlikely that one fac-
tor or phenomenon will explain the pattern of results that ultimately
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emerges. It may be that a combination of economic, social, and politi-
cal incentives and disincentives and changes in the economy explains
why employment of persons with disabilities seems to be declining
(Blanck 2001). 
We have identified some of the possible forces explaining the why
question. Undoubtedly, more factors may be gleaned from the work of
other researchers. We are beginning to investigate empirically ques-
tions regarding whether individuals who report a work disability or
functional limitation continue to experience lower relative employment
rates since the ADA was passed. We need to assess who those individ-
uals are, and why they are or are not employed, before informed deci-
sions about the effects of ADA’s provisions and assessments regarding
possible changes to the law’s provisions can be made. If future research
builds on the studies presented to date, we have the chance of obtaining
at least some answers to these questions.
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1. There is, of course, some debate on this issue (compare, e.g., Posner (1987) and
Donahue (1986, 1987)).
2. The ADA’s language may support this assumed difference in productivity.
Because a qualified individual with a disability is defined as a person who is able
to do the “essential functions” of the job (with or without accommodation), one
may argue that individuals with disabilities who are able to perform only the
“essential functions” are by definition less productive than persons able to per-
form all job functions (Weaver 1991). 
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3. Hale (2001) describes the problems associated with the CPS and SIPP data sets in
examining the employment of individuals with disabilities. He suggests that the
CPS, in particular, cannot be relied on to distinguish those with disabilities from
those without disabilities. Kaye (2002) discusses these problems and proposes
using alternative measures of employment rate, labor force participation, and
unemployment. In addition, Kaye notes that the reported decline in the employ-
ment rates of persons with disabilities after passage of the ADA is mitigated when
using these alternative definitions, and when considering the effect of the early
1990s economic recession and the coinciding rise in working-aged adults apply-
ing for and receiving federal disability benefits such as Social Security Disability
Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI). Burkhauser, Houten-
ville, and Wittenburg (Chapter 2) make note of “substantial increases” in SSDI
and SSI program participation, particularly for men during the 1990s. Bound and
Waidmann (2000) find that movement of men and women with disabilities out of
the labor force and onto the SSDI rolls during the 1990s accounts for much of
their decline in workforce participation, rather than the implementation of the
ADA.
4. Although there may be a number of reasons for the increase over time in the num-
ber of individuals with disabilities who report themselves as unable to work, the
ADA’s provisions, by themselves, are not likely to be a direct cause (see Blanck,
Clay, Schmeling, Morris, and Ritchie 2002). The more likely cause is the avail-
ability of SSDI and SSI benefits to those who are classified as unable to work
under those programs’ definitions. Until the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999), a number
of courts had held that receipt of SSDI or SSI benefits prevented an individual
from asserting that he or she was a qualified individual with a disability under the
ADA. Thus, it could be argued that those courts’ interpretation of the ADA’s pro-
visions had the effect of forcing individuals with disabilities to choose between
attempting to find work and obtaining SSDI or SSI benefits. If the latter was cho-
sen, they ran the risk of being found not covered by the ADA.
5. By way of background, Robert Barnett worked at US Airways for 10 years. After
suffering an on-the-job injury, he transferred into a mailroom position that effec-
tively accommodated his disability. After serving in that position for two years,
Barnett was informed that a more senior employee intended to bump him from the
position, pursuant to US Airways seniority policy. Barnett requested accommoda-
tions that would allow him to perform other jobs, but US Airways rejected those
suggestions. Barnett sued, alleging that US Airways had an obligation to engage
in Title I’s consultative interactive process. The Supreme Court held that because
Barnett’s requested workplace accommodation conflicted with US Air’s seniority
system, the accommodation was not “reasonable” and thereby not required
(Blanck 1996; Issacharoff and Nelson 2001). 
Similarly, Mario Echazabal worked at a Chevron oil refinery for 20 years as a
laborer, plant helper, and pipefitter for various maintenance contractors. Twice
during this period he applied for permanent employment with Chevron as a pipe-
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fitter/mechanic and plant helper. Although Chevron determined on both occasions
that Echazabal was qualified for the positions, Chevron physicians refused to
authorize an offer of employment, claiming that exposure to certain chemicals in
the refinery might exacerbate Echazabal’s Hepatitis C. After Chevron asked
Echazabal’s contracting employer to remove him from the facility entirely,
Echazabal sued Chevron, alleging a violation of the ADA. The Supreme Court
ruled that Chevron could limit the hiring opportunity of an ADA-qualified indi-
vidual with a disability who the company believed might be harmed by exposure
to their workplace environment. Chevron accomplished this goal by relying on a
“direct threat to self” defense to discrimination charges, language set out in regu-
latory guidance by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). 
6. An additional factor regarding the definition of a qualified ADA individual has
been introduced into the mix. In 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity
of the EEOC interpretative regulations of the ADA to include an employer
defense to the hiring of qualified individuals who pose a direct safety threat to
themselves in the workplace (Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 2002, case facts
described in endnote 5). The legal, and ultimately policy, question in Chevron is
to what extent should employers or qualified individuals with ADA covered dis-
abilities decide the degree of risk an individual with a disability can and should
accept in performing a job. Chevron will have further implications for the defini-
tion of ADA qualified persons (see, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, Brief
of the National Council on Disability 2002) and the employment of persons with
disabilities as lower courts endorse the rule that employer qualification standards
include the ability of an individual covered by the law to perform the job in ques-
tion safely.
7. Silverstein (2002) adds four more aspects to the list of factors likely to affect indi-
viduals’ labor supply decisions: 1) the macro-economic status during the report-
ing period (e.g., whether the country is in a deep or mild recession, in the
beginning stages of recovery or full employment); 2) how other protected classes,
e.g., minority groups, are fairing for the same period; 3) the race and ethnicity of
the population and differences for subgroups, e.g., disabled African-Americans;
and 4) an inventory of persons with hidden disabilities, e.g., epilepsy and mental
illness, who may not self-report.
8. Thus, although applicants and employees may themselves be uncertain about
whether they fall within the group of disabled individuals protected by the ADA,
and employers may be similarly uncertain about whether a particular applicant or
employee is an ADA-qualified individual with a disability, economic models of
the effects of the ADA have not yet incorporated this uncertainty.
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